S. Wamiq Jawaid recently sat down with Zahid Hussain, the author of Frontline Pakistan, in New York, to talk about his new book and the future of Pakistan.Given your most extensive journalistic background, what motivated you to write this book?
I have been covering issues pertaining to terrorism for a while, and the focus of my recent writing has been on the Afghanistan-Pakistan situation that has arisen after Sept 11th. I have investigated the rise of Islamic militancy and also witnessed its patronage by the State of Pakistan. Therefore, I wanted to write about this key issue especially since it has become the focus for the international community and incredibly crucial for Pakistan’s own dynamics.
In the last five years so much has happened in Pakistan. Several hundred Al-Qaeda operatives and especially the masterminds of 9/11, were arrested and handed to the United States. In this backdrop we notice that Pakistan was going to war with itself, especially since all the elements which were patronized by the State during the Cold War, have come back to haunt us. This is also an important juncture for us, since the international change after 9/11 has directly affected the domestic dynamics by intensifying the war within which I see crucial for the very soul of Pakistan. The future of Pakistan will be decided by the Global War on Terror, and it is these internal and global ramifications which made me undertake this project.
How do you see your book contributing to the literature already present in the market on the War on Terror, Afghanistan, and Pakistan?
In the past year a lot of books on Pakistan have come out but most have examined the Pakistani situation in a historical context. Most works relate to the 50 some year history of politics in Pakistan, but this is first time that a book deals with the domestic internalization of the September 11 situation and that makes it different than books which have historically examined the rise of Islamic extremism in Pakistan, but which have not been able to establish the link between the State and the rise of Islamic militancy in a post 9/11 world. There is great work on the post Soviet-Afghan war and the rise of militancy then, but my work starts off where others have left off.
Your main thesis has stressed upon the militarization of Pakistan, but what do you say to policy analysts who argue that the lack of governmental control of extremists makes Pakistan the most dangerous nation where the potential of nuclear capabilities landing in the wrong hands is escalating day by day? How true do you think this perception reflects reality?
I think that this is a bit exaggerated. Given that Pakistan is going through a very serious crises, let me stress that there has never been a danger of Islamic takeover of the State. Yes, there are certainly times when it seems that the Pakistani State will fall apart due to internal contradictions as well as the ethnic, economic, and social polarization which has taken place, coupled with the huge role of the Pakistan army in the social strata making the situation untenable. But these are the greater dangers today, rather than a threat of Islamic takeover of the state.
In part it might be correct that if Pakistan falls apart or is fragmented, then it will be a classic example of a collapse of a nuclear state, as seen with the Soviet Union. But the argument of fundamentalist take over of the nuclear arsenal is completely not true because the Pakistan army is still a very disciplined army, it’s still a solid institution and whatever they have done in the past as a policy to support the militants, the Army itself is still very secular. There might be Islamic elements within them, but there is no threat of them coming forth. I think that fear is fundamentally baseless.
So is it safe to say that Islamist factions within the Army are controlled in spite of the policy of supporting militants in the past?
There maybe Islamic elements in the lower-middle ranks who have a very Islamist-nationalistic mindset, but overall it remains a secular army even though they developed a huge economic vested interest in the country. But it continues to be secular and that’s why I never see a possibility of a lower ranking officer launching a coup, it’s not possible at all, especially since it is sternly controlled and hierarchical.
We have seen the past under Zia as the Pakistan Army collaborated with the West, the influence of the U.S. on the function of the military establishment of Pakistan has been immense, regardless of the volatility of the relationship. And in spite of the skepticism of U.S. supporting Pakistan in its dire need, the threat of transforming the Pakistan State into a theocracy is baseless.
Like a Talibanization…
No, it’s not possible at all. What we are seeing today is a part of the country being Talibanized since those regions share similar ethic loyalties with the Pushtuns. It is these frontier areas which have been influenced by the Taliban. And to say that this trend will permeate to the urban centers of the Country is not possible because immense social development has taken place and where education is much higher. One has to examine the Afghan society itself when the Taliban were able to control it, which was a backlash from the tribal areas to take revenge on the more westernized pockets in the region. It is not the case in Pakistan.
Observing these various regions of turbulence, do you think that a military control then helps to control the insurgency to bring about stability?
Western perception is that since the WOT can be fought militarily, a military dictatorship in the context of Pakistan can thus offer more. But what they are forgetting is that this War is a political battle and a battle for ideas, where a political structure would be able to provide much better returns. Military option only escalate problems, and post 9/11 battles are more of like battles of ideas which need a soft intervention not a military option.
You write in your book that, “Despite the backing of the army and America, Musharraf is living on borrowed time…He has spawned a system that is a hybrid of military and civilian rule. It is not a democracy." What does this say about the future of Pakistan?
Musharraf is going from crisis to crisis, and this has further deepened into a multidimensional situation. If you look at the domestic position, Musharraf’s position has become significantly weaker and particularly over the past few months we have seen that he has become more constricted since (a) the democracy he has introduced has not produced results since it is inherently an artificial system where there is a façade of democracy and parliamentary structure; but in fact all power is concentrated in the hands of the military. And (b) this has huge implications on Pakistani society, as when we speak of power, it has broadened the economic disparity.
So all these factors have weakened the Pakistani civil society and democracy cannot function in this kind of situation. For it to function one needs a strong civilian constitution. I am not saying that the opposition is so strong that it can bring down Musharraf but instead I am suggesting that the system is collapsing under its inherent contradictions.
Contradiction between?
Contradiction is huge, as the system is neither a democracy nor a military dictatorship, there will always be an element of uncertainty. In the long run there could be a huge resentment since it is not a completely representative government. Those contradictions have become much more intensified and since we are looking at an election year, it is very difficult for Musharraf to sustain himself especially since he needs a constitutional amendment which – especially now due to the Chief Justice fiasco – won’t be easy to obtain.
The other thing is that the separation and consolidation of powers has created a vacuum, and pressure from the United States is growing because there is a feeling that Musharraf is not able to completely contain the militancy which is a serious threat to the Western nations. Musharraf is kind of a belligerent leader where there is a no win situation for him. Since the crisis is so deep and complex, that is where I feel that it will be difficult for him to survive for long.
How have the Musharraf years, been any different than previous military regimes in Pakistan?
I think that the major differences between the present and the past lie with the domestic environment and the international situation. The past cannot be compared easily especially given the way the military has been operating since the 1999 coup. During the Cold War, Zia-ul Haq extended is office term due to the situation in Afghanistan and because the United States provided security to his regime, since there was no divergence of views between the leaders of the two nations. At that time radical Islam suited the Cold War designs against Communism. Thus I argue that the Zia-ul Haq period was different since he was a creation of the Cold War period, quite different than the factors which have given rise to Musharraf’s era.
Musharraf cannot have the same policy, since unlike Zia – where Islamic militancy perfectly aligned itself as a force against the encroaching communism – Musharraf is full of contradiction since on one hand he perceives himself as a progressive leader with hopes for an “Enlightened Moderation,” but he is also a prisoner of the situation pertaining to extremist militancy.
But with the recent military opposition to the freedom of thought and expression, how is the erosion of the middle-class intellectuals during Zia’s regime any different now?
It is impossible to foresee a time worse than Zia’s crackdown on intellectual freedom in Pakistan. It was a period where we saw the destruction of the civil society and rights of individuals taken away. It was a much more regimented society where the nation had become an intellectual wasteland due to his Islamization policies. And the people who came out of this period are incredibly conservative, so the long term effects of Zia have been devastating for the heart and soul of Pakistan.
But in-spite all this, Musharraf wants to distance himself from the legacy of Zia-ul Haq on various issues especially the women’s rights issues and the freedom of the press, we are approaching a relatively more liberal environment. So differences between the two are vast, yet regardless of the color and policy of the military, it always is a serious problem for the country in the long run.
Aside from the political fragmentation, is there a strong economic polarization in the class structure in Pakistan, which many analysts have argued is a classic case for Marxist Socialism?
There are different kinds of fragmentation such as social, political, ethnic, religious, etc. all which have been intensified by the economic policies of the government. And as one part of the country goes in one ideological direction and the other half goes an opposite way.
You mentioned the women’s rights issues and human rights in rural Pakistan, why has it been hard to implement those laws and is this difficulty a reflection of the tribal jirga system?
Pakistan is a unique country where a large portion of the population has remained outside the main stream of the legal structure of the State. And that has complicated this issue deeply in the parts of the Frontier which is almost an autonomous area ever since the British, and then there is a other region in Baluchistan which lacks the basic infrastructure and mechanics of law, crucial to any modern state. That has made the kind of a country were the sectarian law has never been imposed.
Is it that is hasn’t been introduced, or that the tribal areas are resilient to accept it?
Basically when a state is weak then this kind of situation occurs. If a legally rooted, autonomous State cannot establish itself in its own constituencies, that is when you have deviant elements trying to assert themselves. And this is an indication of the weakness of the State, where elements start relying on the old system by going back to their traditions and what they understand as their historical past, simply because an alternative option for them is missing
Just to wrap up, for political and security analysts concerned about Pakistan and her policy towards tribal regions of Waziristan, what do you think should be pivotal in their understanding of the region?
I feel that they have to deal with the situation not only militarily since there is no military situation to this problem. But instead to have some kind of political and economic alternative to their historical traditions. Pakistan has purposely termed this area as an autonomous region in order to support the various wars it has fought, and you cannot get rid of this unless you bring these regions into the main stream instead of deliberately keeping a lawless area. Assimilating them into the State and then investing funds to build a proper infrastructure in the region is crucial for a people who have forever felt like outsiders. These areas are very poor societies where unemployment is high, and you have a culture of militancy since that is the only form of employment they know of. Only by eliminating these problems can you then enforce law in this region and thereby curb the militancy and extremism.
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S. Wamiq Jawaid is a political anthropologist, conducting research at Columbia University in New York. He has written extensively on the cultural histories of South Asia and the larger Muslim world.
